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Regulation of Insider Trading
in Hong Kong
By JONATHAN M. GAFNi
Member of the Class of 1988
I. INTRODUCTION
The early 1970s were a period of rapid growth for the Hong Kong
economy.1 The growth fueled large-scale securities speculation,2 which
was reflected in an eighteenfold increase in volume on Hong Kong's
stock exchanges between 1969 and 1973. Unfortunately, this growth of
the Hong Kong securities market has been accompanied by widespread
trading abuses.4
Controlling these abuses has been problematic. Many business lead-
ers serve as directors of several corporations and trade shares through
nominees.' At the same time, some securities dealers are generally will-
ing to place their own interests above those of their clients.6 In addition,
great potential for corruption or co-option of government regulators ex-
ists.7 Finally, a number of market observers consider Hong Kong inves-
tors unsophisticated gamblers' who base their investment decisions on
rumors.9 The combination of these factors makes it difficult to initiate
1. Gu Nianlong & Yuan Shibang, Economic Development in Hong Kong, in ALMANAC
OF CHINA'S ECONOMY 1981, at 939 (Xue Muqiao ed. 1982).
2. AJ. YOUNGSON, HONG KONG ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLICY 34 (1982).
3. CENSUS & STATISTICS DEP'T, HONG KONG, HONG KONG SOCIAL & ECONOMIC
TRENDS 1964-1974, at 56 (1976).
4. B.A.K. RIDER & H.L. FFRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 328
(1979).
5. Id. at 338-39.
6. Id. at 338.
7. Id. at 339 n.95. For a description of how regulators may be co-opted by prospective
or former employers, see infra text accompanying note 81.
8. M.F. HIGGINS, SECURITIES REGULATION IN HONG KONG 1972-1977, at 150 (1978).
9. B.A.K. RIDER & H.L. FFRENCH, supra note 4, at 338. See also Davies, Traveller's
Tales, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 15, 1986, at 45.
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investigations and locate the real offenders when insider trading occurs.10
This Note will review the attempts of Hong Kong regulators to con-
trol the abuse of inside information. These efforts will then be compared
to the United States' system, which has a longer regulatory history,
greater investigative facilities, and stronger means of enforcement. 1
Based on this comparison, this Note will suggest rules to improve the
effectiveness of the Hong Kong regulatory scheme. 12
II. BACKGROUND
A. Hong Kong
The behavior of investors in Hong Kong reflects their attitudes to-
wards insider trading.13 One important factor is that securities trading in
Hong Kong, for the most part, is fed by rumors.' 4 As a result, trading on
accurate information is difficult because investors must distinguish be-
tween rumors and facts.
What exacerbates this difficulty is the willingness of Hong Kong in-
vestors to gamble when making investment decisions. 5 Between 1972
and 1973 bank lending increased by fifty percent, fueling a stock ex-
change roller coaster ride during which stock prices quintupled, only to
lose half of their value three weeks later. 6 In 1980 the scene repeated
itself, leading one commentator to warn:
10. Even those responsible for controlling insider trading have been discouraged by the
practical limitations. In 1975 James Selwyn, the Hong Kong Commissioner for Securities,
complained:
To really clamp down on insider trading we would have to cover everyone from a
company chairman to the office cleaner rummaging through a waste paper basket for
information....
For example, if one man who dominates a public company (and there are quite a
few in Hong Kong) develops a serious illness and withholds the fact from all but his
closest family, how could we prove that subsequent trading in the shares was not
transacted by someone with privileged knowledge?
Surry, HK's Inside Traders Can Breath Again, S. China Morning Post, Jan. 17, 1975, Business
News, at 1, cols. 2-3.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 82-141.
12. A shadow hanging over any discussion of future Hong Kong policy is the expected
1997 takeover of the Colony by the People's Republic of China. While this Note will not
touch upon that issue, it should be noted that policy decisions made during the next ten years
may influence policy after the takeover.
13. In Hong Kong the term "insider dealing" is used interchangeably with the terms "in-
sider trading" or "inside trading." In this Note only the latter terms will be used.
14. B.A.K. RIDER & H.L. FFRENCH, supra note 4, at 338; Davies, supra note 9, at 45.
15. M.F. HIGGINS, supra note 8, at 150. See also A.J. YOUNGSON, supra note 2, at 34.
16. A.J. YOUNGSON, supra note 2, at 34.
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"When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of
the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill done."
Hong Kong's credibility and security as a modem financial centre
and a soundly based industrial economy have been harmed already by
excesses of speculation, and further and more extensive damage may
be caused in the long run.
17
Furthermore, Hong Kong's general reputation was not helped by the
widely shared criticism that the Colony's brokers and bankers are too
self-interested. 8
1. Development of the Hong Kong Regulatory System
Because of the uncontrolled speculation and abuse of information in
the early 1970s, the Hong Kong Government decided to create a regula-
tory scheme for the securities market. In 1974 the Government enacted
the Protection of Investors Ordinance over little objection. The lack of
resistance was probably due to the belief that the statute was directed
only at blatantly fraudulent practices.19 The Securities Ordinance,20 pro-
posed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council at nearly the same time,
was the source of much more debate before it was finally enacted. The
ordinance contained many provisions that upset the previously unregu-
lated securities traders.2 One particular section created a storm of pro-
test-section 140, which dealt with insider trading.
22
Section 140 contained strong criminal and civil penalties for insider
trading.23 The section was never implemented 24 because, according to
the Hong Kong Financial Secretary, Parliament was planning to enact
anti-insider trading legislation in Great Britain, and the Hong Kong
Government wanted to learn from the British experience. 25 A more
17. Id. (quoting J.M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST
AND MONEY 159 (1936)).
18. See A.J. YOUNGSON, supra note 2, at 33; B.A.K. RIDER & H.L. FFRENCH, supra note
4, at 338.
19. B.A.K. RIDER & H.L. FFRENCH, supra note 4, at 329. As further discussed below,
despite the potential scope of its language, the Protection of Investors Ordinance has never
been applied to insider trading. See infra text accompanying notes 58-61.
20. Securities Ordinance 1974, reprinted in ORDINANCES OF HONG KONG FOR THE YEAR
1974, at A51.
21. Aside from insider trading, the Ordinance regulated dealers, investment advisers,
stock exchanges, and various forms of securities trading. Id. at A45-50.
22. B.A.K. RIDER & H.L. FFRENCH, supra note 4, at 338.
23. Securities Ordinance 1974, pt. XII, § 140, reprinted in ORDINANCES OF HONG KONG
FOR THE YEAR 1974, at A153.
24. Each part of the Securities Ordinance became operative only upon order of the Gover-
nor. Id. pt. I, § 1(2), reprinted in ORDINANCES OF HONG KONG FOR THE YEAR 1974, at A51.
25. Rider, Insider Trading Hong Kong Style, 128 NEW L.J. 897, 898 (1978).
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plausible explanation may be that the Government wanted to legislate
against insider trading, thus helping Hong Kong's reputation in the in-
ternational business community while avoiding the headache of
enforcement.26
In 1978 the Hong Kong Government amended the Securities Ordi-
nance, repealing section 140 and replacing it with the current provisions
of part XIIA.27 Part XIIA prohibits certain types of insider trading in
securities listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.28 The types of trad-
ing proscribed by the revised ordinance are the following:
(a) when a dealing in the securities is made, procured or occasioned by
a person connected with that corporation who is in possession of
relevant information concerning the securities;
(b) when relevant information concerning the securities is disclosed by
a person connected with that corporation, directly or indirectly, to
another person and the first-mentioned person knows or has rea-
sonable grounds for believing that the other person will make use
of the information for the purpose of dealing, or procuring another
to deal, in those securities.29
The body responsible for deciding whether such transactions have
taken place is the Insider Dealing Tribunal, an institution created by part
XIIA.30 The Tribunal, which consists of a Supreme Court judge and two
other members,31 must investigate suspected incidents of insider trading
at the direction of the Hong Kong Financial Secretary. The Financial
Secretary's order may follow a recommendation by the Securities Com-
mission or may be based on suspicions originating elsewhere.3 2 The Tri-
bunal has broad discovery powers to assist it in its investigations.33
In investigating possible violations of the Ordinance the Tribunal
must interpret three phrases contained in part XIIA's definitions of in-
sider trading: "relevant information concerning the securities," "con-
nected with that corporation," and "knows... that the other person will
make use of the information."34 The first term describes the information
26. B.A.K. RIDER & H.L. FFRENCH, supra note 4, at 339.
27. 19 LAWS OF HONG KONG [LHK] ch. 333, pt. XIIA (1978).
28. Id. § 141A(1). It should be noted that Hong Kong had four exchanges until 1986,
when the Stock Exchanges Unification Ordinance, 20 LHK ch. 361, pt. III (1980), took effect.
See Surry, supra note 10, at 1, col. 4; Wallace, New Stock Listing Rules Require More Disclo-
sure, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP. Feb. 15, 1986, at 11.
29. 19 LHK ch. 333, pt. XIIA, § 141B(1).
30. Id. § 141G(1).
31. Id. § 141G(3).
32. Id. §§ 141H(1)-(2).
33. Id. §§ 141K-141L.
34. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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that is restricted under the insider trading law. Part XIIA defines "rele-
vant information" as "information which is not generally available but, if
it were, would be likely to bring about a material change in the price of
those securities."3 Unfortunately, this definition is vague. The statute
leaves unclear when information is not "generally available" and what
would constitute a "material" price change.36 Reasons for this vagueness
may be to afford some discretion to judicial bodies and to avoid a clear
rule that might be circumvented by less scrupulous individuals.
Part XIIA restricts the use of relevant information by persons "con-
nected with a corporation." The Ordinance defines an individual "con-
nected" with a corporation as a director or employee of the
corporation,37 a "substantial shareholder" in the corporation,38 or a per-
son who has access to relevant information because of a professional or
business relationship between that person and the corporation,39 includ-
ing a relationship based on an expected transaction involving the person
(or the person's company) and the issuing corporation.' Also, a corpo-
ration is "connected" if any of its directors or employees has one of these
relationships with the issuer.41 Thus, the potential list of defendants in
an insider trading action is quite large.
A connected person who discloses relevant information, however,
will only be culpable if the person "knows or has reasonable grounds for
believing that the other person will make use of the information."42 In
other words, a person cannot be a negligent "tipper" of inside informa-
tion. The Tribunal's definition of insider trading in In re Hutchison
Whampoa, however, requires "the conscious use [of inside information]
for the purpose of profit or... the avoidance of loss.., or the disclosure
of confidential price-sensitive information to a person likely to use the
information for that purpose.",43 Thus, an insider's liability may depend
35. Id. § 141D(1).
36. For example, a press release which is seen by institutional investors might not be
"generally available" to individuals. Furthermore, a "material" price change may be different
to different investors.
37. 19 LHK ch. 333, pt. XIIA, § 141E(1)(a).
38. Id. § 141E(l)(b). The statute defines a "substantial shareholder" as a person holding
an interest in the corporation's equity securities equal to more than 10% of the share capital or
more than 10% of the voting power at a general meeting. Id. § 141E(3).
39. Id. § 141E(1)(c)(i).
40. Id. § 141E(l)(d).
41. Id. § 141E(2).
42. Id. § 141B(1)(b).
43. Report of the Insider Dealing Tribunal, In re Hutchison Whampoa Ltd., Hong Kong
Government Printer No. 514612-7L-3/82, at 3, para. 8, quoted in Bokhary, Insider Dealing-
Identifying and Tackling It, 14 HONG KONG L.J. 11, 20 (1984).
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on the tippee's state of mind. Unfortunately, the only subsequent deci-
sion by the Tribunal did not turn on this issue, and thus shed no light on
whether the courts will continue to respect the In re Hutchison
Whampoa definition. Future tribunals ultimately may apply the scienter
requirement to both tips and transactions, so that the legislative intent
will not be circumvented.
While the Insider Dealing Tribunal has substantial investigative
powers and a large number of potential targets, the results of an inquiry
are quite limited. The Tribunal's report following an investigation can
only state if "culpable" insider trading has occurred, who was involved,
and the extent of each person's "culpability."'  The sole punitive action
available to the Tribunal is the public dissemination of its findings."
"Culpability" is defined by exception-a person is not culpable for
insider trading if the transaction meets any of the following conditions:
(a) the sole purpose of the transaction was the acquisition of qualifica-
tion shares required as a director (or intending director) of a
corporation;
(b) the transaction represents the bona fide performance of an under-
writing agreement regarding the securities; or
(c) the transaction represents the bona fide performance of the person's
duties as a personal representative, liquidator, receiver, or trustee in
bankruptcy.4 6
In addition, a person may not be culpable for a trade if his or her purpose
was not primarily "the making of a profit or the avoiding of a loss (for
himself or another) by the use of relevant information,"'  or if the per-
son entered the transaction as another person's agent, without giving ad-
vice on (or actually selecting) the securities involved.4" This exception
leaves the scienter question previously discussed49 open to the Tribunal's
discretion.
Part XIIA creates a special exception to corporate culpability. If a
director or employee of a corporation possesses inside information re-
garding certain securities, and the corporation subsequently trades those
securities, the corporation will not be found culpable under the following
circumstances:
44. 19 LHK ch. 333, pt. XIIA, §§ 141H(3)-(4).
45. Id. § 1411. A violative transaction cannot be voided after a finding ofculpabililty. Id.
§ 141A(2).
46. Id. § 141C(1).
47. Id. § 141C(3).
48. Id. § 141C(4).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
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(a) the decision to trade the securities was made on behalf of the corpo-
ration by someone other than the person possessing the information;
(b) the corporation had internal controls designed to avoid the transmis-
sion of inside information or investment advice between the person
possessing the information and the person making the trade decision;
and
(c) no inside information or investment advice was actually communi-
cated between the two persons.50
This exception, known as the "Chinese Wall" defense,51 protects those
multiservice financial corporations that maintain internal controls on the
flow of inside information and provides an incentive for corporations
without such controls to establish them.
5 2
As discussed briefly above, the Insider Dealing Tribunal has made
only two inquiries of possible insider trading since 1978. Its first case
was an eighteen-month investigation into the possible insider trading of
shares of Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. The inquiry, which ended in 1982,
resulted in no findings of culpability, in spite of strong evidence that ac-
cess to inside information had led to major share purchases.
5 3
In 1984 the Tribunal was called upon to review the questionable
dealings surrounding a major real estate purchase agreement between In-
ternational City Holdings Ltd. and Everbright Industrial Co.5 4 As a re-
sult of the investigation, two corporations, a company chairman, a
director, and four others were found culpable of insider trading.55 The
Tribunal found that the total value of the illegal transactions was HK$39
million (US$4.5 million), an amount considered "tiny" compared to the
wealth of the cited parties.56 The insignificance of the reported payoff
suggests that either the Tribunal was unable to uncover the full extent of
the illegal activity, or that even a small reward is worthwhile when the
50. 19 LHK ch. 333, pt. XIIA, § 141C(2).
51. B.A.K. RIDER & H.L. FFRENCH, supra note 4, at 344.
52. Id.
53. The Tribunal established that an impending change in control of Hutchison
Whampoa had been leaked and that an insider had made purchases of Hutchison Whampoa
stock before the deal was announced publicly. Bowring, A Deal of Confusion: A Report on
Insider Trading Begs More Questions than It Answers, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 26, 1982, at
149, 151.
54. Lau, Insider Trading Probe in Hongkong, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 1, 1984, at 10.
55. Hong Kong Tribunal Censures Company for Insider Trading, Asian Wall St. J.
Weekly, Apr. 28, 1986, at 24, col. 4.
56. Cottrell, The Secret Society: Top Hong Kong Businessman Cited for Insider Trading,
FAR E. ECON. REV., May 8, 1986, at 138.
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risk of being caught is marginal.57
2. Potential Means of Regulation
Part XIIA is the only explicit regulation of insider trading in Hong
Kong. Although the Hong Kong courts have not applied them, there are
other statutes which could be weapons against the improper use of mate-
rial, nonpublic information. One possible regulation is the Protection of
Investors Ordinance,58 which was enacted in 1974. This ordinance gives
rise to criminal5 9 and civil60 liability for inducing someone "by any
fraudulent or reckless misrepresentation" to enter into a securities
transaction.
The Protection of Investors Ordinance defines a "fraudulent or reck-
less misrepresentation" in a number of ways, including:
any statement or forecast from which the maker of the statement in-
tentionally or recklessly omitted a material fact, with the result that
the statement was thereby rendered untrue, misleading, or deceptive,
or, as the case may be, the forecast was thereby not capable of being
justified or was thereby rendered misleading or deceptive.
61
Insider trading should qualify as an offense under this definition; a per-
son who trades securities while in possession of undisclosed inside infor-
mation implies that the shares have a certain value that is not reflected in
their price.
A second untested provision is part XII of the Securities Ordi-
nance,62 which prohibits the use of misleading statements (or omissions)
in the sale of securities 63 and imposes criminal' and civil 65 sanctions on
violators. As with the Protection of Investors Ordinance, insider trading
should fall within the scope of part XII because the second party to the
transaction will have been misled by statements or material omissions
regarding the value of securities sold.
Neither the Protection of Investors Ordinance nor part XII has been
applied to insider trading. Both of these regulations, however, bear great
57. For a discussion of some of the problems which make discovery of insider trading
difficult, see infra text accompanying notes 67-74.
58. 19 LHK ch. 335 (1983).
59. Id. § 3(1)(a)(i).
60. Id. § 8(1)(a)(i).
61. Id. § 3(2)(d). See also id. § 8(2)(d).
62. 19 LHK ch. 333, pt. XII (1978).
63. Id. § 138.
64. Id. § 139.
65. Id. § 141(1).
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similarity to Securities and Exchange Commission Rule l0b-5(b),66 a
main source of anti-insider trading regulation in the United States. Thus,
while Hong Kong already has some of the tools necessary to regulate
insider trading, it has not made use of them.
3. The Attraction of Insider Trading in Hong Kong
In the past, there have been three reasons why insider trading has
been attractive in Hong Kong. First, it is a common practice in Hong
Kong for a business leader to serve as a director of several companies.67
These multidirectorships provide access to a large store of privileged in-
formation regarding each company that might be used for personal finan-
cial advantage.
Second, a person trading on inside information in all probability will
not be caught. A popular practice in Hong Kong is the use of nominee
shareholders to hide the identity of the actual beneficial shareholder.68
This practice is successful because the identification of beneficial share-
holders is not required.69 The Colony has unsuccessfully attempted to
require adequate disclosure of beneficial interests. In 1981 various gov-
ernment officials who complained that they had been administering the
securities laws "with their hands tied behind their backs," proposed a
variety of disclosure laws.70 Four years later, the Government drafted
what was to be a "sweeping change" from the status quo: a set of regula-
tions that would require a company's directors and substantial share-
holders to disclose their beneficial interests in its shares and to register all
major transactions involving those shares. 71 These regulations were not
enacted as initially proposed. In 1986, however, new stock listing rules
were promulgated in preparation for the unification of the four Hong
Kong stock exchanges.72 The formerly ambitious disclosure proposals
were "watered-down" to require only biannual disclosure of directors
holdings and disclosure of certain "material" transactions by directors
"as soon as practicable. ' 73 Local professional investors thought the new
66. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1987).
67. Some people have been known to serve on the boards of forty or fifty different compa-
nies. B.A.K. RIDER & H.L. FFRENCH, supra note 4, at 338-39.
68. Id. at 339.
69. Even then, the chain of nominees can end in a numbered offshore bank account that
can be controlled by the beneficial shareholder without fear of government interference. Id.
70. Rider, Disclosure of Beneficial Interests in Securities, 2 COMPANY LAW. 138, 138-39
(1981).
71. Disclosure Requirements Proposed Again, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Nov. 15, 1985,
at 6.
72. See supra note 28.
73. Wallace, supra note 28, at 12.
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requirements were insufficient, 74 possibly because they still did not deal
with the problems of nominees or substantial shareholders who are not
directors, nor did they provide for immediate disclosure of nonmaterial
trades.
The third factor which encourages insider trading is the absence of
effective sanctions. Under part XIIA of the Securities Ordinance, if the
Tribunal finds that an individual has engaged in "culpable" insider trad-
ing, the only recourse is to publicize that person's culpability.75 The pur-
pose of publicly disclosing the Tribunal's finding of culpability is twofold:
to cause the inside trader to lose all standing in the business community
76
and thus to deter future insider trading.77 This policy is ineffective for
two reasons. First, since the Tribunal has conducted only two inquiries
over the past nine years, a person violating the statute can feel secure that
there will be little chance of charges being brought. Second, there is no
indication that the adverse publicity will cause an individual to lose his
or her standing. In the one case in which the Tribunal found directors
culpable of insider trading, 78 the ruling apparently did not affect the vio-
lators' community standing.7 9 Ultimately, the purpose of relying on ad-
verse publicity as a sanction will be circumvented where "some might be
tempted to take the risk in the belief that bad publicity is a temporary
occupational hazard."8 Thus, a prospective inside trader in Hong Kong
does not face many hurdles.
The Colony's attempts to control insider trading have followed a
common pattern: the Securities Commission suggests a strong policy,
but then enacts a weak one. This pattern of retreat suggests that the
Commission is under great pressure from local investors. Some of this
pressure may stem from the number of experienced businesspeople in
Hong Kong. Because of the Colony's size, only a few people have busi-
74. Id. at 11-12.
75. 19 LHK ch. 333, pt. XIIA, § 1411(4) (1978).
76. Willoughby, Securities (Amendment) Ordinance 8 of 1978, 8 H.K.L.J. 246, 249
(1978).
77. See id. (citing INST. OF DIRECTORS (LONDON), GUIDELINES FOR DIRECTORS 20).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57 (discussing the International City Holdings
case).
79. Cottrell, supra note 56, at 138. A government committee has recommended that an
acceptable way to remove inside traders from the business community would be to disqualify
them from taking management positions. STANDING COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW RE-
FORM, FIRST REPORT TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL 1 4.1-4.2 (1985),
cited in Bates, Companies (Amendment) Ordinance 1984-I1, 15 HONG KONG L.J. 298, 317 &
n.17 (1985).
80. Insider Trading: A Two-Year Trial, S. China Morning Post, Jan. 26, 1978, at 2, col. 1.
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ness expertise.3 I This results in potential "revolving door" conflicts: the
individuals responsible for regulating business in Hong Kong may be
sympathetic to the interests of former employers, or may want to avoid
antagonizing the people with whom they plan to seek employment after
leaving government service.
These pressures have led to a regulatory structure that lacks a clear
definition of insider trading, a means for detecting violations, and a
strong system of deterrence. The next section will review the more effec-
tive regulatory system of the United States, which, if tailored to Hong
Kong business conditions, could improve the control of insider trading in
the Colony.
B. United States
In the nearly fifteen years since the need to control insider trading in
Hong Kong was first realized, the Colony has failed to develop a system
of either legislative or adjudicative regulation. Future development of
the Hong Kong system is likely to be equally inefficient if regulators fail
to take notice of the regulatory attempts of other countries with large
securities markets. The use of the United States as one such model is
appropriate because of its eighty-year history of regulating insider trad-
ing through court decisions, statutes, and regulations.
1. Early Developments in the Control of Insider Trading
Under common law a person trading securities had no affirmative
duty to disclose information to the other party. The rule of "caveat
emptor" dominated; a person had to make the right inquiries before the
other party acquired a duty to disclose any knowledge of inside informa-
tion. 2 Absent an independent duty of disclosure, there could be no lia-
bility for trading on inside information.
In 1909, however, the United States Supreme Court found that an
affirmative duty of disclosure does exist. In Strong v. Repide,83 a director
of a sugar company tried to purchase the interest of a minority share-
holder without telling her the future value of her shares.84 The Court
rescinded the sale of the stock, finding that the director had a duty to
disclose the true value of the stock. The Court based its decision on the
81. B.A.K. RIDER & H.L. FFRENCH, supra note 4, at 338. The shortage of qualified busi-
nesspeople is also the reason for the large number of multidirectorships. Id.
82. D. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING HANDBOOK 24-25 (1986).
83. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
84. The value of the company's shares was expected to rise dramatically following its
planned sale of property to the Philippine Government. Id. at 425.
1987]
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"special facts" of the case." This case began the decline of the applica-
tion of common law principles to securities cases.
Twenty-five years later, Congress passed the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act),86 which regulates all aspects of securities trans-
actions. 7 The scope of regulation is very broad, partly because of the
definition of the word "security" established by the Securities Act of
1933 (1933 Act). 8
The greatest contribution of the 1934 Act to the control of insider
trading is section 10(b), which empowered the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to enact regulations against deception in securities
transactions. 89 In 1948, using the mandate of this section, the SEC en-
85. The "special facts" relied upon by the Court included the director's role in the sale of
the corporate property and his attempt to hide his identity when purchasing the shares. Id. at
431-32.
86. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C.
§ 78).
87. T.L. HAZEN, THE LAw OF SECURiTIEs REGULATION 232 (student ed. 1985). The
reasons for the enactment of the 1934 Act are broadly stated as follows:
[T]ransactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and
over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest which makes it
necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices
and matters related thereto, including transactions by officers, directors, and princi-
pal securities holders, to require appropriate reports to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for securities and a national
system for the clearance and settlement of securities transactions and the safeguard-
ing of securities and funds related thereto, and to impose requirements necessary to
make such regulation and control reasonably complete and effective, in order to pro-
tect interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect
and make more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve System,
and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions....
1934 Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982).
88. A "security" is defined by section 2(1) of the 1933 Act as:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certifi-
cate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment con-
tract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or... in general, any interest or instru-
ment commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982).
89. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
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acted rule lOb-5. Rule 10b-5 prohibits the use, in connection with a se-
curities transaction, of interstate commerce, the mails, or the national
securities exchanges as follows:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
90
The next section will review the courts' use of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 to control the abuse of inside information.
2. Judicial Application of Rule lOb-5
Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 look very much like general prohibi-
tions of securities fraud. While fraud often occurs in the context of face-
to-face transactions, most securities transactions are not face-to-face (or
even "quasi-face-to-face," as in Strong v. Repide91) since they take place
through brokers and exchanges. Thus, after the promulgation of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5, there was some question whether there could be
fraud in a failure to disclose inside information while making a purchase
or sale when there was no personal contact with the party on the other
side of the transaction.
In Cady, Roberts & Co.92 the SEC found that fraud exists when a
person whose "special relationship" to a corporation affords access to
inside information breaches a duty not to take unfair advantage of the
information by trading the corporation's securities. The SEC believed
that, otherwise, those not in possession of the information would be "ex-
ploited." 93 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with this result and held that im-
personal transactions are subject to the prohibition against insider trad-
ing because of "the justifiable expectation of the securities market place
that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal
access to material information.
'94
As a result of the language in rule lOb-5 and the Texas Gulf Sulphur
decision, the definition of "material information" became very impor-
90. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
91. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
92. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
93. Id. at 912.
94. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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tant." In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. ,96 a proxy dispute case,
the Supreme Court decided that information contained in a proxy solici-
tation is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote."
97
This definition has become the standard used in insider trading cases as
well; information is material only if a prospective buyer or seller of shares
is likely to consider it important in deciding whether to buy, sell, or hold
shares.98
In Cady, Roberts the SEC found that a "special relationship" must
exist between a person and a corporation before the person must abstain
from trading the corporation's securities.99  In Chiarella v. United
States"o the Supreme Court expanded this rule. Chiarella, an employee
of a firm which printed announcements of corporate takeovers for a take-
over bidder, purchased the shares of a target company named in those
announcements. In reversing Chiarella's conviction for 10(b) and lOb-5
violations, the Court held that "the element required to make silence
fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent in this case. No duty could
arise from [Chiarella's] relationship with the sellers of the target com-
pany's securities, for [he] had no prior dealings with them."' 1 Thus,
Chiarella established the rule that a person who trades on inside informa-
tion must also have some relationship with the other parties to the trans-
action before liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 can exist.
The prosecutor in Chiarella proposed an alternative rule: the de-
fendant should be held liable for breaching a duty to the takeover bidder
by using information he received through his employers, who were in
turn employed by the bidder. Because this so-called "misappropriation"
theory was not presented at the trial level, the majority refused to rule on
its merits.' 2 The Second Circuit, however, has subsequently endorsed
this theory.'
0 3
In Dirks v. SEC"° the Supreme Court decided the circumstances
under which a person receiving inside information by way of a "tip"
95. Id.
96. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
97. Id. at 449.
98. D. LANGEVOORT, supra note 82, at 124 & n.2.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
100. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
101. Id. at 232.
102. Id. at 235-37.
103. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983).
104. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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could be found liable for violations of 10(b) and 10b-5. First, the Court
rejected the argument of the SEC that "a tippee 'inherits' the Cady, Rob-
erts obligation to shareholders whenever he receives inside information
from an insider .... 1O5 The Court repeated the rule of Chiarella that the
duty to disclose information comes from a relationship between the trad-
ing parties, "and not merely from one's ability to acquire information
because of his position in the market."10 6 Instead, the tippee "steps into
the insider's shoes" only when there has been a breach of fiduciary duty
by the tipper, and the tippee knows or should know that the breach has
taken place.10 7 Such a breach exists when the tip would result in some
personal benefit to the tipper,10 8 and the tipper has the intent to deceive
or defraud. 0 9
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court recognized that
10(b) and lOb-5 violations require a certain mental state."1  The Court
based its decision on the language of section 10(b) 1 and a review of the
structures of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 12 Because scienter is a prerequi-
site to 10(b) and 10b-5 liability, the "Chinese Wall" defense 13 should be
available to multiservice financial firms; the department not in possession
of the inside information cannot have the requisite intent to misuse the
information.
1 4
3. Strict Liability for Insider Trading
The preceding section established that a certain mental state must
exist before there can be a violation of section 10(b) or rule lOb-5.115
There are, however, two exceptions to the scienter requirement. The first
is a regulation enacted pursuant to section 14(e) of the 1934 Act, which
prohibits fraud in connection with tender offers. 16 The regulation, SEC
rule 14e-3, places an absolute ban on trading a target company's securi-
105. Id. at 655.
106. Id. at 657-58 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 n.14 (1980)).
107. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
108. Id. at 662-64.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
110. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
111. The Court specifically refers to the use of the words "'manipulative or deceptive' ...
in conjunction with 'device or contrivance.'" Id. at 197.
112. The opinion notes that when the drafters of the two acts intended to create liability
predicated on negligence, they did so expressly. Id. at 200-01.
113. See generally supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
114. See H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2274, 2284.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 107-114.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
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ties while in possession of material nonpublic information about the
tender offer and on giving such information to someone when a trade
would be foreseeable.'
1 7
The second source of strict liability is section 16(b) of the 1934
Act,1 ' which allows corporations to recover profits earned from the
purchase and sale of its registered securities119 by officers, directors, and
ten-percent beneficial shareholders of the corporation within any six-
month period. The profits from such transactions are known as "short-
swing profits."
120
The purpose of section 16(b) is to prevent "the unfair use of infor-
mation which may have been obtained by [a] beneficial owner, director,
or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer... irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer .... 121
The statute not only ignores the intent of the insider, it also ignores
whether he or she made use of inside information at all.'2 2 This rule
reflects the recognition by Congress of the potential for abuse of inside
information and the strong desire of Congress to avoid such abuse. Con-
gress' intent has led the courts to apply a particularly harsh measure of
damages for violations of 16(b).1
2 3
4. Other Deterrents to Insider Trading
Aside from the statutory prohibitions on insider trading, a number
of other deterrents to insider trading exist. For example, the SEC and its
predecessors have traditionally employed such remedies as rescission,
124
injunctions, 25 and disgorgement.126 In addition, there are private rights
of action for violations of sections 10(b)'
27 and 16(b).' 28
Congress was not satisfied with these remedies. In order to make a
117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1986).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
119. Le., securities registered pursuant to § 12 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982).
120. T.L. HAZEN, supra note 87, at 413-14.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
122. T.L. HAZEN, supra note 87, at 417.
123. See, e.g., Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 751 (1943) (applying a "lowest price in, highest price out" measurement of profits
illegally gained within the six-month period).
124. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
125. See, e.g., SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
126. See, e.g., SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983).
127. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974).
128. See, e.g., Dottenheim v. Murchison, 227 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 351
U.S. 919 (1956).
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stronger statement against the abuse of material, nonpublic information,
Congress enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 as an
amendment to the 1934 Act.129 The Insider Trading Sanctions Act cre-
ated a new civil penalty for those who trade securities while in possession
of material inside information1 30 and for those who provide the tips
which lead to such trades.
13 1
The new civil penalty consists of a fine of up to three times the
"profit gained or loss avoided" as a result of the violative transaction. 132
"Profit gained" and "loss avoided" are defined by the Act as "the differ-
ence between the purchase or sale price of the security and the value of
that security as measured by the trading price of the security a reasonable
period after public dissemination of the nonpublic information."' 133 Es-
sentially, the definition of "profit gained or loss avoided" is a codification
of the measure of profits to be disgorged that was applied in SEC v. Mac-
Donald. 114 The treble damages provision offers an extra deterrent to in-
sider trading and guarantees that the offender will not retain any
"postdissemination" profits. 135
In addition to creating the new civil penalty, the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act also strengthened the existing criminal penalties. While
the Act left the five-year maximum prison sentence (per offense) intact, it
increased the maximum criminal fine from $10,000 to $100,000 per of-
fense.136 Thus, insider trading can be quite expensive.
Before the Government can apply the various sanctions, it must dis-
cover violations of the securities laws. To accomplish this the United
States has developed relatively advanced means of enforcement. When
price and volume activity for a certain stock exceeds expected limits,
transactions in that stock are "flagged" by stock exchange computers for
investigation. Then the SEC looks for signs of insider trading. Such
signs include large purchases of small stocks, trades by officers of the
issuer, or transactions by several investors bearing the same last name or
zip code. 3 7 With the expansion of the SEC's Electronic Data Gathering,
129. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1985).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1985).
134. 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983).
135. Goelzer, Walter, Sanger, Cohen & Jayne, Insider Trading Legislation: A Review and a
Preview, in INSIDER TRADING: COPING WITH THE USE & ABUSE OF MARKET SENSITIVE
INFORMATION 239, 250 (H. Pitt ed. 1985).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. III 1985).
137. Laderman, The Epidemic of Insider Trading, Bus. WK., Apr. 29, 1985, at 78, 80-81.
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Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) computer network, 138 such investiga-
tions should be facilitated in the future. Furthermore, the SEC has been
working to reduce the number of beneficial owners hiding behind nomi-
nees.'3 9 While every illicit transaction cannot be detected, 1" the SEC
does notice the major violations.
14 1
III. REFORMING THE HONG KONG SYSTEM
Currently, insider trading in Hong Kong goes virtually unchecked.
Actually, "local laws and customs almost invite it."' 42 Government reg-
ulators seem afraid to establish stiff controls on the misuse of inside in-
formation. The regulations that do exist are ineffective because they are
difficult to enforce and the sanctions which might result from enforce-
ment are not likely to deter violations.
Before the regulation of insider trading can be improved, the Securi-
ties Commission must assume a more aggressive posture. Two steps
should be taken by the Hong Kong Government to overcome the eco-
nomic and political pressures on regulators. First, to avoid the pressures
of the "revolving door," '43 the Government should encourage the forma-
tion of a corps of career securities regulators. Then, to reduce the effect
of political pressures in Hong Kong, the Government must find an over-
riding motivation for change.
In the United States, Congress stated its motivation as follows:
The United States securities markets are liquid, efficient, and fair.
The prices of the vast majority of actively traded securities reflect
available public information about companies and the economy. Capi-
tal formation and our nation's economic growth and stability depend
on investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of our capital
markets.
138. Bloomenthal, EDGAR Update, 8 SEC. & FED. CORP. L. REP. 113, 113 (1986). The
future expansion of computer technology is expected to improve the efficiency of the EDGAR
system in much the same manner that word processors improved the efficiency of lawyers. See
id. at 115.
139. In order to allow issuers to send proxy statements to as many beneficial owners of
shares as possible, intermediaries are forwarding proxies to nonobjecting parties. Bloomen-
thai, Shareholder Communications-Herein of NOBOs and OBOs, 8 SEC. & FED. CORP. L.
REP. 89 (1986); Robinson, How to Solve the Riddle of Beneficial Ownership, in XI SEC '83 at
37-44 (H.S. Schlagman & N.H. Hirsch eds. 1982).
140. Laderman, supra note 137, at 80.
141. See, e.g., Scott, In Vigil on Inside Trading, Computer Blips Upstage Human Tips,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 3, 1987, at 21, col. I (describing the discovery of suspected in-
sider trading by R. Foster Winans, Ivan Boesky, and Dennis Levine).
142. Templeman, The Stone Wall of Swiss Secrecy, Bus. WK., Apr. 29, 1985, at 92.
143. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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Insider trading threatens these markets by undermining the pub-
lic's expectations of honest and fair securities markets where all par-
ticipants play by the same rules.144
By comparison, Hong Kong is only beginning to realize the importance
of equal access to securities information. The Deputy Securities Com-
missioner recently noted that improved disclosure of corporate informa-
tion would likely attract institutional investors from the United States
and Europe.
14 -
The stock listing rules promulgated in Hong Kong during 1986 rep-
resent the first step towards broad corporate disclosure. These rules,
however, are not comprehensive. One important target of improvements
is the use of nominees by beneficial shareholders. In the United States
nominees and street names are primarily used by banks, insurance com-
panies, and brokers. 146 Since those firms are not expected to use nomi-
nees to abuse inside information, the desire to "pierce the nominee's veil"
is fueled not by a need to enforce securities laws, but by the desire of
stock issuers to have the beneficial owners of shares exercise their proxy
rights.147 Thus, the SEC has been satisfied with discovering the identities
of nonobjecting beneficial owners only.
148
In Hong Kong the more widespread use (and abuse) of nominees by
individual investors 49 warrants more stringent measures. Neither indi-
vidual nor institutional investors should be permitted to use nominees
unless there is a legitimate and necessary purpose for doing so. Further-
more, to deter the use of offshore nominees Hong Kong should en-
courage other countries to participate in an exchange of securities market
data to facilitate enforcement. Finally, automating the local securities
market would simplify an international data exchange and would make
local enforcement more simple.
Once regulators are willing to control the market and data is avail-
able for the investigation possible abuses, an effective regulatory scheme
must be established. Such a scheme must start with a definition of in-
sider trading. In the United States the courts have defined insider trad-
ing ."' Recently, however, criticism of this willingness to let prosecutors
144. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2274, 2275.
145. Wallace, supra note 28, at 11.
146. Robinson, supra note 139, at 43-46.
147. Id. at 39-41.
148. Id. at 46-48.
149. See B.A.K. RIDER & H.L. FFRENCH, supra note 4, at 339.
150. Calling Noah Webster, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1987, at 26, col. 1.
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"make up rules as they go along" has grown. 5' As a result, the Senate
has begun to investigate the possibility of enacting a statutory
definition. 52
Hong Kong already may have found the better approach to defining
insider trading. Part XIIA of the Securities Ordinance outlines insider
trading in enough detail to allow investors to comply with the regula-
tions, but is also broad enough to permit the courts to close the loopholes
that would probably exist if the statute were too precise. The Hong
Kong statutory scheme would also permit the development of a body of
case law similar to that which has arisen in the United States since the
SEC enacted rule lOb-5. This development has not yet taken place, be-
cause of the investors' lack of sophistication and the Securities Commis-
sion's weakness.'
53
The Hong Kong definition of insider trading contains one weakness
which greatly affects the ability of the Securities Commission and Insider
Dealing Tribunal to find that prohibited transactions have taken place-
namely, the requirement of wrongful intent. 154 One solution to this
weakness would be to hold an investor strictly liable for transactions
made while the investor was in a position to receive inside information.
This suggestion, which in essence would be an expanded version of sec-
tion 16(b) of the 1934 Act, might be appropriate until the investment
climate improved, by which time other regulatory mechanisms could be
implemented.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of the regulatory scheme depends on
the deterrent effect of the punitive sanctions. In the United States a wide
array of sanctions are available, including equitable relief, fines, and
prison sentences. The only sanction Hong Kong has applied so far has
been the public designation of several directors as culpable inside traders,
a designation that has little deterrent effect, if any. The Hong Kong Gov-
ernment must apply stiffer measures to control insider trading effectively.
History suggests that strong regulations can affect the Hong Kong
securities market. In 1974, following the meteoric increase in trading on
the Hong Kong market, the combined turnover volume of the four Hong
Kong stock exchanges dropped by over seventy-five percent.' 55 The dra-
matic fall in volume might have resulted from an investor population
which tired of endless speculation. The drop in volume, however, also
151. Id. at 26, cols. 1-2; Laderman, supra note 137, at 88, 92.
152. Calling Noah Webster, supra note 150, at 26, col. 2.
153. M.F. HIGGINS, supra note 8, at 149-50.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
155. CENSUS & STATIsTics DEP'T, HONG KONG, supra note 3, at 56.
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coincided with the enactment of the Securities Ordinance and the Protec-
tion of Investors Ordinance. Thus, another explanation for the decline
might be that the investing public was afraid that the excesses of the
previous four years would not be tolerated under the new regulations. If
this explanation is accurate, regulators should take a hardline approach
to the treatment of insider trading in Hong Kong.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Hong Kong has a serious insider trading problem that, if left un-
checked, may adversely affect the influx of capital and economic strength
of the Colony. This problem appears to stem from the nature of the Hong
Kong securities market and from the inability of the Hong Kong Gov-
ernment to legislate effectively against the problem. The existing legisla-
tion has failed because of the Government's inability to enforce it on a
regular basis and because of the inadequate remedies provided when the
current regulations are enforced.
A comparison of the Hong Kong regulatory scheme to that of the
United States reveals that the Hong Kong system lacks the investigative
facilities and punitive sanctions available to the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the United States. Since these factors make the Ameri-
can system more effective, it is recommended that they be implemented
in Hong Kong. In this way the Hong Kong Securities Commission can
regain control of its markets.
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